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In the history of Western philosophy as well as the natural sciences, the concept 
of the soul has undergone fundamental transformations. In his book The Soul in 
British Romanticism: Negotiating Human Nature in Philosophy, Science, and Poetry, 
Ralf Haekel manages to provide the reader with comprehensive insights into the 
manifold discourses that played a role in the development of the concept of the 
soul in British Romanticism. In the wake of Plato’s Phaedo, his Phaderus, and the 
Christian tradition, the soul has predominantly been associated with transcend-
ence, immateriality, and immortality. As Haekel demonstrates, however, for the 
Romantic poets the concept of the soul is considerably more complex, frequently 
welding together contradictory aspects of both traditional transcendental and 
modern immanent concepts of the soul.
The book is structured into two parts, in the first of which Haekel is con-
cerned with the soul as a concept in philosophy, natural philosophy, and modern 
science. Here, Haekel concisely discusses classical and Renaissance concepts 
of the soul in Platonism and Neoplatonism (especially Ficino), within the Aris-
totelian tradition, and in Christianity. Yet, Haekel shows that the concept of 
the soul in British Romanticism is not only informed by Plato and Aristotle but 
also by mechanistic philosophy, physiological theories such as vitalism, proto-
biological theories developing out of the discovery of the nervous system, as 
well as research on the brain. Following Aristotle’s idea of the vital function of 
the soul, Haekel convincingly illustrates that around 1800 life was understood 
as an immanent entity, and the principle animating life is only rarely conceived 
of as emanating from a transcendental divinity, but increasingly regarded as 
material.
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The first part of the book indeed reads as a tour de force in key questions 
in the history of philosophical thought and human consciousness. The discus-
sion revolves around central passages of Descartes’s writings on the substance 
dualism of soul and body and around debates in British empiricism sparked off 
by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke about the ontological status of the soul. In 
addition, the reader gets to know about the correspondence between Samuel 
Clarke and Henry Dodwell regarding the mortality or immortality of the soul, and 
about the idealism of George Berkeley compared to David Hume’s rather phenom-
enological approach to the world. Illuminating excursions into the development 
of neuroscience with thinkers such as David Hartley and Joseph Priestley show 
them to be as important influences on the Romantic poets as Erasmus Darwin’s 
concept of the embodied mind or the advent of mind-dissecting phrenology.
As it becomes clear in the first part of the book that Romantic literature makes 
use both of traditional transcendental and 18th-century concepts of the immanent 
soul, Haekel questions the Foucauldian claim of an abrupt break between the 
classical and the modern episteme around 1800: “It is more apt to say that science 
in the Romantic period was characterised by conflicting theories simultaneously 
struggling for predominance” (60). Coleridge, for example, does not approve 
of the mechanistic philosophies following Bacon, Descartes, and Newton, and 
shields himself from the increasing immanentisation of the soul by elaborating 
a model of the soul in line with Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Christian perspec-
tives. Haekel takes Coleridge’s Kubla Khan as an example of the “co-existence of 
mutually exclusive theories of the soul during the period of Romanticism” (80). 
The poem is at once regarded as supporting the idea that thought is an immanent 
product of an opium-induced brain, and as employing a concept of a transcen-
dental mind because the pleasure dome would, after all, be built in air. Whether 
or not, however, the reader agrees with Haekel’s quasi New Critical claim that the 
poem “to a certain extent […] achieves organic unity” (80), and whether specifi-
cally this tension of the material and immaterial component of the soul as mind 
depicted in the poem “actually increase[s] the poem’s quality” (80), should be 
open to debate.
The second part of the book concerned with the soul as form in aesthetics, 
poetics, and poetry argues that the medium of the latter was particularly apt to 
negotiate the “basic uncertainty as to the soul’s nature and status” (123). Haekel 
asserts that it re-enters into the discourse as an aesthetic quality in the form both 
of the imagination and as the self. The creative imagination, Haekel argues per-
suasively, emerges as the abode in which transcendence and immortality are 
negotiated anew. As such, the imagination generally serves as a metaphor for the 
transcendental in the immanent medium of poetry. To support his thesis, Haekel 
provides readings of Blake’s The Four Zoas, Wordsworth’s Immortality Ode as well 
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as Coleridge’s Dejection. An Ode with regard to the soul’s forms and functions 
within these poems. In the context of Coleridge’s subdivision of the imagination 
into an epistemological and an aesthetic power, Haekel offers an excellent dis-
cussion of how the Coleridgean imagination, and particularly his concept of the 
symbol allowing the “consubstantiality of signifier and signified” (167), adopts 
the function of the soul, thus mediating between immanence or materiality and 
transcendence or, in the case of Coleridge’s theology, God.
Additionally, according to Haekel, the soul was also understood in conjunc-
tion with ideas of self-hood in Romantic literature. In this context, the book exam-
ines how the function of the soul as self is re-inscribed into the medium of poetry 
itself, and argues that the narrative or discursive construction of the self replaces 
the transcendental constitution of the soul as self. This is illustrated in the analy-
ses of Keats’s romance Endymion and of Mary Tighe’s epic poem Psyche; or, The 
Legend of Love. Moreover, these chapters interestingly disclose the gender-bias 
of the discussions about the soul, because in contrast to their male counterparts, 
female Romantic authors tend to “consider the soul to be androgynous” (182).
In his last chapter “Towards a Media Theory of the Soul,” Haekel considers 
the aporia that an immaterial soul can only be expressed by a material medium, 
as “the soul in literature necessarily rests on the materiality of its own medium” 
(199). Providing key passages from P. B. Shelley’s poetological writings, the con-
clusion is that “between 1800 and 1820 there occurs a paradigm shift within 
the system of literature – a transition from a proposed immediacy of poetry to 
a keen awareness of its medial condition” (202). With regard to this medial self-
reflexivity, Shelley’s Epipsychidion serves as an example of becoming aware of 
the fact that even the most imaginative poetry must eventually be communicated 
by language and therefore cannot provide immediate access to some transcend-
ent realm of immortality.
The aim of the present study “to describe the historical development of the 
discourses on the soul, and, on the other hand, to investigate the close connec-
tion between the soul and the genre and medium of poetry” (11) stands as an 
ambitious task. As a consequence thereof, the hybrid variety of discourses on the 
concept of the soul at times evokes the impression that ‘soul’ describes a rather 
imprecise umbrella term for all sorts of things: transcendence, the principle of 
life, pure reason, the brain, the self, to name but a few. Of course this fleeting 
character of the concept of the soul is not Haekel’s fault, and the forte of the book 
is thus to accept precisely this challenge of delineating the contours of a term so 
widely used in Romantic poetry. The book should not only be of great interest for 
scholars in the field of Romanticism, but also for anyone interested in key ques-
tions in late 17th to early 19th century metaphysics and epistemology.
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